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IN THE 
SupreiDe Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
REXXOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff 0/I'Ul Appell0nt, 
vs. 
R. L. BIRD and ~IAE C. BIRD, his 
·wife, et al, 
Defendants and R.espondents. 
Case No. 
7344 
Brief of Respondents 
Statement of F~acts 
Respondents do not agree that the appellant has 
stated all the material facts and take exception to the 
argumentative nature of the so-called Statement of Facts, 
particularly at pages 8 and 9 of his Brief. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
References to the Record in this ease will be accord-
ing to the numbering of this .Court, the transcript of 
testimony being R. 109 to 187. 
At page 6 of his Brief, appellant refers to page 13 
of Exhibit A as covering property not involved in this 
action. A comparison of this deed with Respondent~s 
counterclaim (R. 19) discloses that the property involved 
is described with reference to two corners of Lot 19, 
Block 22, 5 Acre Plat "A" and that page 13 of Exhibit 
A involves but one parcel of land. 
The statement at page 6 that there was no Auditor's 
Affidavit on the 1928 assessment rolls is troublesome. 
Counsel for appellant made the statement at a prelim-
inary discussion and it was not denied by respondent. 
The trial court did not treat this discussion as evidence 
or as a pre-trial since evidence was required by testimony 
or stipulation on all those matters. See, for example, R. 
177, 178 and 179. 
The last paragraph on pag-e 6 of Appellant's Brief 
states no evidence of title passing from Salt Lake City 
was introduced. But· see page 13 of Exhibit A, also R. 
177. Respondents' position was stated by counsel at R. 
118 and 123-125; but this probably cannot be considered 
evidence. 
The top paragraph on page 7 ignores Respondents' 
claim to prevail based on deed from Salt Lake City for 
delinquent special assessments. (Tr. 118, 123-125, 177, 
178). 
Appellant fails to state on page 8 of his Brief that 
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3 
respondents relied also on section 104-29-1, U.C.A. 1943. 
(Tl• 1·J·J_1•)"l 1~1 1 Rs> 183) • -- -t)' _ L , L ....... • 
Appellant's Brief states on page 9 that taxes were 
not paid by Bowers or Hansen for 17 years from 1928. 
There is no eYidenre on the years 1935 to 1945, inclusive. 
Taxes for 1 ~1:?S to 193-!: were covered hy tax sale for 1928. 
(See pages 3 and 5 of Exhibit A). Respondents paid 
the taxes from 1946 to 1948, inclusive. (Tr.177). 
~\t page 10 Appellant's Brief says: 
·'Judgment was also granted to respondents 
for the possession of the property (Tr. 69) the 
trial judge giving as his reason for finding in 
favor of respondents, that appellants' action was 
barred by the four year statute of limitations 
(Tr. 71). 
It is plain from the statements of the trial judge 
that respondent did not prevail primarily on the statute 
of limitations. (R. 180, 183) 
''THE COURT: Well, if you have no title, 
how can you raise the statute of limitations on 
him~ (R. 182). 
"THE COURT: Well, I can rule on that 
statute of limitations.-! don't think it is neces-
sary to make that, but for your benefit I wil1 
hold that." (R. 183). 
Appellant's Specification of Er'f!ors 
Appellant has not argued his specifications of error 
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nulnbers 4 ·6 8 9 11 13, 14, and respondent assumes 
' ' ' ' ' they are abandoned. 
Cross-Assignments of Error 
1. The lower court erred in denying respondents' 
nwtion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. 64). 
POINTS RELIED ON BY RESPONDENT 
1. Appellant's cause of action was barred by the 
statute of limitations and respondent should have been 
given judgment on the pleadings. 
2. If respondent cannot prevail on Point 1, then 
respondent should have been given judgment under sec. 
104-29-2, U.C.A. 1943 
3. The statute of lin1itations does not bar respon-
dent's counterclaim. 
4. It was not error to admit testimony that the 
deed from Bowers Investment Company to V. Lynn Han-
sen was in fact a mortgage transaction. 
5. Appellant had no title to the property and judg-
ment against him as to all parties was right. 
6. Refusal to permit appellant to amend his com-
plaint in the midst of the trial was not error. 
7. Respondents' evidence of title was sufficient to 
support judgment quieting their title against plaintiff. 
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ARGUl\fENT 
Point 1 
Appellant's cause of action was barred by the statute 
of limitations and respondent should have been given judg-
ment on the pleadings. 
Two related question are involved in this Point: 
A. Can appellant identify this action with his first 
suit against respondents and others, within 104-2-41, 
r.C.A. 1943~ 
B. Are sections 104-2-5, 104-2-5.10, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943, as added by chapters 18 and 19, Laws of 
Utah 1943, and Section 104-2-6, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, as amended by Laws of Utah 1943, chapter 20, 
applicable to appellant~ 
It is conceivable that both the appellant's suit and 
respondent's counterclaim are barred and that neither 
can move against the other. This Court should endeavor 
to avoid such a result. If these statutes bar actions by 
both tax title holders and those holding under the former 
owner there seems to be no practical method of resolving 
the dispute over this property. 
These statutes of limitations were intended, and 
should be construed, to protect purchasers of tax titles 
after four years, particularly where the tax title holder 
has gone into possession. 
Appellant commenced this suit Oct. 14, 1947, (R. 3) 
which was more than four years after the effective date 
of these statutes (App. Brief 19) and this action appears 
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to be barred unless protected by section 104-2-41, U.C.A., 
1943, so as to give appellant the advantage of his first 
suit against respondents and others. (Third Amended 
Complaint, par. 2, R. 39). 
Our position on this question is based on the assump-
tion that the firfl.t suit involved an alleged cause of action 
against these rlefendants Bird and no other persons. 
Upon the failure of that action, not upon its merits, a 
new suit could. be instituted within one year under the 
provisions of ~ection 104-2-41, U.C.A., 1943. Since the 
case at bar involves the addition of a new and allegedly 
necessary party (R. 39, .par. 3) it is not the same cause 
of action and is therefore barred by the statutes dis-
cussed herein. 
''It is established that in order to comply 
with statutory provisions of the character under 
consi(1eration, where a new action is brought 
after a failure of a prior suit, the second suit 
1nust be based substantially upon the same cause 
of action, and the parties in each suit must be 
the same.'' 8-l: Am. J ur. 232. 
This rule was affirmed in Platz v. International 
S1nelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 Pac. 187, where the 
court said at page 349: 
"It may be admitted that when an action 
fails otherwise than upon the merits the statute 
of limitations does not run, and a new action rnav 
be instituted between the same parties and upo~ 
the same cause of action within one year. Also 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
that the plaintiff i~ entitled to the benefits of 
Cmnp. Law~ of Utah, 1917. ~N'. G4Rt" 
This was an action brought against the wrong corpora-
tion initially because the corporation had changed its 
name upon dissolution of the original and the second suit 
was held to be within the statute because the difference 
in identity of the defendants was immaterial. 
An Annotation on this question appears at 3 A.L.R. 
82-1. and the rule as to identity of the defendants is an-
notated at pages 826 to 828. The Utah case seems to be in 
accord with the general rule that parties defendant need 
not be identical if they are substantially identical, but no 
rase goes so far as to permit the addition of entirely new 
and necessary parties. At page 827 the annotation refers 
to two cases involving quiet title suits which show the 
significanre of the very question here involved. 
"\Yhere the first suit was against various 
defendants occupying various parts of the land 
sued for, and it ·was severed as to A as to his 
part of the land, and later there was a nonsuit 
in regard to him, it was held that the statute a:p-
plied to a new suit against A. East Tennessee 
Iron & Coal Co. v. Lawson (1895) --------Tenn.--------, 
35 S. vV. 456. But where, in a similar case, the 
new suit added other necessary defendants, it 
was held that the statute did not apply. East 
Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. \Valter (1895) _______ _ 
Tenn. ________ , 35 ~- W. 459. '' 
In Jordan v. Commissioners of Bristol County 
("Jfass), 167 N.E. 652, it was held that although a statute 
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extends the benefit of the limitation statute for one year 
for mere irregularity or formal errors which are cor-
rected upon the second suit, a mistake in naming the 
wrong defendant is not within the statute. 
And, in Luft v. Factory Mutual Liability Insurance 
Co. ( R. I.), 155 At. 526, where a plaintiff brought suit 
for .personal injuries against the insured and an insur-
ance company which was dismissed because the wrong 
insurance company was named and then a second suit 
was brought naming the correct insurance company as 
defendant, the court held: 
''There is no merit in the plaintiff's further 
cbntrntion that they may prosecute their suits 
under the provision of Section 9, Chapter 334, 
G. L. 1923, which permits the bringing of a new 
suit within one year if the original action was 
for any cause abated. That statute is not appli-
cable in the case of a defendent which was a 
stranger to the original action. See Mackel v. 
Pawtucket Gas Co., 48 R. I. 485, 139 A. 308." 
The second suit must be on the same cause of action 
as the first suit in order to come within the protection of 
this statute. Williams v. Nelson, 45 Utah 255, 145 Pac. 
39,. 41. 
Appellant therefore lost the protection of the statute 
(104-2-41) when the second suit was brought against ad-
ditional and necessary parties, and also because the first 
suit failed on the 1nerits. (See Point 2.) 
Appellant does not contend that the statutes (104-
2-5, 5. 10 and 6) are not applicable to one claiming under 
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cedes that by arguing that the statutes apply to both 
parties, (App. Brief, 19-20) and either or both may be 
barred if the action, defense, or counterclaim he filed 
after four years frmn the effeetiYe date of the statutes. 
This compels appellant to face the provisions of sec. 
10-±-29-2, P.C.A. 19-±3. 
Point 2 
If respondent cannot prevail on Point 1, then I'espon-
dent should have been given judgment under sec. 104-29-2, 
U.C.A. 1943. 
Respondents submit that if this Court finds the case 
at bar is a cause of action different from that stated in 
X o. 80375, appellant may not have the benefit of 104-2-41 
and is therefore barred by the time provisions of 104-2-
5.10, U.C.A., 1943, as amended. 
If the court finds the case at bar the same cause of 
action as No. 80375, appellant is barred because he may 
not sue twice on the same cause of action unless he is 
protected by a dismissal without perjudi~e under 104-
29-1. 
The case of Pender v. ~1:ose Alix, et al., No. 80375, 
was dismissed on motion of defendants Bird after the 
appellant had refused to amend following the sustain-
ing of respondents' demurrer. The order of dismissal 
was as follows: 
''The demurrer of the defendants, R. L. Bird 
and l\f ae C. Bird, to the complaint of the plain-
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tiff having been sustained on September 11, 1947, 
hy the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of 
the above entitled court, on the grounds and for 
the reason that there was a misjoinder of parties 
defendant, that separate causes of action herein 
are ilnproperly united, that several causes of 
action are not separately stated, that paragraph 
8 was ambiguous in not disclosing to which pro-
pert? the claim of any defendant related and for 
the ground that paragraph 8 was uncertain in 
not disclosing whether the claim of each defend-
ant was as to all property described in the cOin-
plaint or as to only eertain parcels, and if the 
latter then to which .parcels, and the said defend-
ants having given the plaintiff notice of the ruling 
on said demurrer on September 17, 1947, thereby 
giving plaintiff until September 28, 1947, within 
which to amend his complaint, which time was 
extended by the court upon application of the 
plaintiff to and including October 8, 1947, and the 
plaintiff having failed to amend his c01nplaint 
vvi thin the time allowed by the court, and the de-
fault of the plaintiff in failing· to amend having 
been duly entered on October 10, A. D. 1947; 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 
complaint be dismissed as to the defendants, R. L. 
Bird and Mae C. Bird. 
Dated this 18th day of October, 1947. 
(s) ROALD A. HOGENSON 
Disrict Judge'' 
A recent Utah case held that such an order of dis-
missal barred an attempted second suit. State v. Cali-
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fornia Packing Corporation, 1944, 105 Utah 191, 145 P. 
2d 78-1, at 786. 
* * * 
'' \Yhere a demurrer to the complaint is sus-
tained on the ground that it fails to state facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the 
defendant (plaintiffn refuses to plead further, 
and the court dismisses the action for that reason, 
such judginent of dismissal will prevent the main-
tenance of a new action for the same cause of 
action where the allegations in the two complaints 
are substantially the same, and no substantially 
new facts are alleged in the new complaint. This 
is true even though the court was incorrect in 
holding that the original complaint did not state a 
cause of action.'' (authorities cited) 
Since the complaint as to defendants Bird in the s·econd 
action, No. 81647, avers substantially the same facts as 
the complaint in the first action, No. 80375, appellant 
should be barred from bringing the case at bar. 
As stated, by way of argument, in the California 
Packing case at page 786 of 145 p. 2d: 
''A dismissal of action after a demurrer has 
been sustained and plaintiff has refused to plead 
further is not mentioned in Section 104-29-1 as a 
ground for a 'dismissal without prejudice' so it 
must come under Section 104-29-2 and be 'with 
prejudice'.'' 
And so here, since the order of dismissal in the first 
suit was not upon any of! the grounds stated in 104-29'-1 
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12 
the case falls within 104-29-2 and the instant suit, not 
following a dismissal not upon the merits, cannot be re-
vived. 
To repeat: If the cause of action is different, the 
second suit does not -come within the protection of 104-2-
41 and is barred by the statutes of limitations. And if 
the cause of action is the same ·it is barred by the dis-
mis:-:al on the merits under 104-29-2. 
Point 3 
The statute of limitations does not bar r·espondent'S' 
counterclaim. 
A cursory reading of the statutes suggests that their 
purpose was to compel fee owners who lose their pro-
perty at tax sales to take action within four years from 
the date of sale to the county, or forever hold their peace. 
A study of these statutes, as amended, suggests the possi-
hilit~, that both the purchaser of the tax title and the 
original fee owner must within four years from the date 
of tax sale bring action for recovery of possession or in-
volving the title of lands sold to the county. 
These sections are all so similar that they are con-
fusing. As we analyze them, they are reconciled as fol-
lows: 104-2-5 as amended simply adds to the previous 
provision for actions involving recovery or possession 
of lands a shorter period than seven years for actions 
to recover property ''_held hy anothrr under tax deed.'' 
This limitation was elaborated by 104-2-5.10 which ap-
plied specifically to property sold pursuant to 80-10-68 
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(6), which provision was enacted by Laws of Utah, 1939, 
Chapter 101. This section ( 104-2-5.10) applied both to 
actions for reeoYery or possession and to defenses or 
counter claims for recovery or possession, restricting the 
maintenance or setting up of either. Upon amendment in 
1~)-l/ this section was n1ade applicable also to the property 
sold to the county prior to 1939 under the earlier law, 
which was 80-10-66, R.S.U., 1933, and the restriction on 
defenses "-as eliminated. As applied to the case at bar, 
this means that there was no restriction as to the defense 
after the effective date of the 1947 amendment C~Iay 13, 
1947), if it be assumed that this is a suit involving re-
covery or possession of lands. Since the defense in this 
action was interposed subsequent to 1fay 13, 1947, to-
\\-it: February 4, 1948, it is not ·barred. by 104-2-5.10. 
If then this is a suit for recovery or possession, it could 
be that the action is barred originally by 104-2-5, and now 
by 104-2-5.10, but that the defense is not barred. 
104-2-6 does not relate to recovery or possession of 
real property but to actions "founded upon the title to 
real property or to rents or profits out of the same.'' 
In analyzing these sta:tutes, we should not overlook 
the intent of the legislature as indicated by 104-2-5 to 
protect tax titles. The interest of the state is to apply 
property taxes equally and compel all property to bear 
its fair share of the load. If tax titles are made invul-
nerable they are made valuable and the county will be 
better able to sell them for all of the delinquent taxes. 
In 104-2-5 the bar of the statute is placed against 
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''actions brought for the recovery of real property. held 
by another under tax deed.'' This is not ambiguous and 
deals with possessory actions. 104-2-5.10 still deals with 
possessory actions and would he inconsistent with the 
other statute if it barred actions and counterclaims by 
tax title holders. And the omission of the word "de-
fenses'' is consistent with that. If the former owner is in 
possession and continues in possession he 1nay defend 
that possession and preserve the status quo even after 
four years fron1 the auditor's deed has run; hut if such 
forn1er mvner needs affirmative relief his clai1n ·will be 
barred after four years. 
But 104-2-6 does not deal with possession-it deals 
with ''title to real property or to rents or profits out of 
the same'' and the former owner is denied right of action 
or defense because of his delay. The former owner may 
be considered to have abandoned his claim and is not in 
possession to give notice of claim, so the legislature's 
intent to settle tax titles requires that the former owner 
have no right to interfere with the title after four years. 
This approach harmonizes the statutes and is backed 
h~· reason. The former owner is compelled to take his 
action within four years unless he is in possession, in 
which case he can defend his possession but cannot ex-
pand it by action or counterclaim. 
It is doubtful whether any other view could be up-
held under the constitution. These statutes commence to 
run from the auditor's deed to the county. At that time 
there is no tax title holder and no cause of acdon. To 
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permit the statute to start running at that time might 
bar the remedy before the right of action has materia-
lized fron1 a sale by the county to a prospective tax-payer. 
This would tend to depreciate the values of tax titles, and 
would be based upon a violation of constitutional princi-
ples in barring n remedy before the right has become ac-
tionable. 
This principle was thus stated in Taylor v. Miles, 
5 Kansas -198, 7 A1n. Rep. 558, at 566 : 
··A statute of limitation can only be applied 
where one person has received or suffered some 
injury fr01n another person either in contract 
or tort. It must operate to bar a oause of action, 
for it semns absurd to say that a cause of action 
can be barred if no cause of action has ever ac-
crued.'' 
This court has recognized the principle by its holding 
in State Tax Comrp.ission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 
100 Pac. 2d 575, 131 ALR 816 that a cause of action ac-
crues when it becomes remediable in 'the courts, with all 
prerequisites cleared away. In that case this Court 
quoted with approval the following statement from 
Sweetser v. Fox, 43 Utah 40, 48-49, 134 P. 599, 602, 47 
LRA (NS.) 145, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 620: 
''It is a rule of universal application that a 
cause or right of action arises the moment an 
action may be maintained to enforce it and that 
the statute of limitations is then set in motion. 
The test, therefore, is, Can an action be main-
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tained upon the particular cause of action in 
quef'tion ~ If it can, the statute begins to run.'' 
See also 34 Am. Jur. 47; 54 C.J.S. 204. 
The Court should hold tha:t the counterclaim of the 
tax title holders is not barred and that they should have 
had judgment on the pleadings and on the evidence. 
Point 4 
It was not error to admit testimony that the deed from 
Bowers Inve~stm,ent Company to V. Lynn Hansen was in 
fact a mortgage transaction. 
Appellant considers this matter under Point 3 of his 
argun1ent. lie argues that there was no evidence that 
he got nothing hy his deed from Hansen and also that the 
evidence was not admissible because the issue was not 
raised by the pleadings. The two positions are incon-
sistent. 
\Vas the evidence admissible' 
The evidence was of two kinds: that Hansen had no 
title to convey because his was only a security interest 
and that Hansen told Pender he owned nothing from 
which it follows that Pender was not a bona fide pur-
chaser for full value. 
No contention is made that evidence of lack of good 
faith or of notice of lack of title was improperly re-
ceived. Appellant squarely objected, however, to intro-
duction of evidence that Hansen's deed fr01n Bowers In-
vestment Company was actually a mortgage (R. 125-126, 
131.) 
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The answr>r of defendants Bower~ alleges that ap-
pellants "haYe no right, title or interest in said real 
property as deseribed in plaintiff's Third Amended 
C01nplaint and that no other party has any right, title 
or interest in and to said property." (R. 60) In effect 
this is a denial of appellant's title and an assertion of 
their own title. Appellant so characterizes it. (App. 
Brief, 36.) 
~-\._ppellant's Brief (pp. 36, 37) belabors a point about 
pleading equitable title. There was no effort to show 
equitable title in Bowers, but legal title, as claimed in 
their answer. Proof that Hansen got equitable title 
only defeated Bowers as well as appellant. (R. 172). 
Appellant has no support for the view that the 
e\idence was inadmissible for the purpose of defeat-
ing appellant. There was no request to limi't its effect 
and it was already admissible under the general denial 
to show no title in appellant. 
''Para. 1998. Right To Show That Deed was 
Intended as a l\fortgage Under Denial of Owner-
ship. In actions in ejectment and suits to quiet 
title or to foreclose a vendor's lien, a denial in 
the answer of an allegation of ownership in the 
complaint raises an issue upon which the defend-
ant may show that a deed under which plain-
tiff claims title was given as security for a debt, 
and was in tended as a mortgage.'' Bancroft, 
Code Pleading, P. 3432. 
General rules of pleading sustain the court in admit-
ting this evidence. 
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''As a rule, a general denial is a cornplete 
defense unless inconsistent with the specific alle-
gations of the answer. It puts in issue every 
material allegation of the complaint, that is, every 
material allegation constituting the cause of ac-
tion. For example, it puts in issue allegations as 
to nonpayment of the note sued on, ownership, 
title, and value, as well as an allegation that de-
femlant claims some interest in the land described 
in the complaint.'' Bancroft, Code Pleading, P. 
612. 
''Under a general denial evidence is admis-
sible as to all1natters which go to prove that the 
plaintiff ncYer had any cause of action, even 
though such matters going to the original cause 
be affirmative in their character. Under this rule 
c•vidence of any fact is admissible which is in-
consistent with and thus negatives the plaintiff's 
cause of action." Bancroft, Code Pleading, P. 962. 
That evidence showing an instrument in form a deed 
was in fact a mortgage is admissible is hardly open to 
question, so far as the parol evidence rule is concerned. 
Brown v. Skeen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P. 2d 24, 32; Bybee v. 
Stuart, ------, Utah ______ , 189 P. 2d, 118, 122. 
Point 5 
App·ellant had no tiile to the prop~rty and judgment 
against him as to all parties was right. 
Appellant does not argue this point in his Brief, 
but is content to rely on a quit claim deed from V. Lynn 
Hansen, who appeared to he owner of record. (Exhibit 
A, pages 7 and 10). 
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The Court found (R. 90) and the evidence estab-
lished (R. 131, 1-U) that appellant's grantor had only 
a mortgage interest in this proper'ty. Hansen could 
ther·eby ronyey only that which he had, and since the 
nwrtgage had been paid (R. 132) Hansen had nothing. 
~eetion 78-1-12, U.C.A. 1943. 
In Kix Y. Tooele County, 101 Utah 84, 118 P. 2d 376 
at page 377 this Court said: 
"Plaintiff's title is founded upon quit-claim 
deeds. ~nell deeds do not imply the conveyance 
of any particular interest in property. See Sec-
tion 78-1-12, R.S.U. 1933, as compared with Sec-
tion 78-1-11, R.S.U. 1933. Plaintiffs acquired only 
the interest of their grantors, be that interest 
what it may." 
This is the rule stated in the annotations at 44 
A .. L.R. 1266, and 162 A.L.R. 556. See also l\fessenger v .. 
Peter, 129 Mich. 93, 88 N. W. 209. 
Appellant is not a purchaser in good faith and for 
value and has no standing to claim that his interest is 
superior to any other interest. 
On the question of good faith and payment of value 
hy appellant it is not directly material whether the con-
veyance from the Bowers Investment Company to Han-
sen (Exhibit 1) is a deed in legal effect or a mortgage. 
If the deed conveyed fee title from Bowers Investment 
Company to Hansen, the title apart from tax deeds is 
in F. B. Bowers, for Hansen conveyed to F. B. Bowers 
at a date prior to the deed to appellant (Exhibits 3 and 
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;) ) . ]ijven though the deed to F. B. Bowers was not re-
corded it prevails over a deed to a purchaser who first 
records but who does not purchase either in good faith 
or for full value. If the conveyance from Bowers In-
vestment Company to Hansen is found by this court to 
be in fact a mortgage, 'then the title apart from tax 
deeds is in the Bowers Investment Company. Evidence 
is in the record (R. 132) that the obligation owing 
Bowers Investment Company to Hansen, for which the 
deed was security, was paid by the Bowers Investment 
Company. 
"The general rule is that payment of the 
mortgage debt ipso facto et eo instanti extin-
guishes the mortgage." ( 36 Am. J ur. Sec. 406, 
891, and cases cited.) 
" * * * it is certain that the rnortgagee's in-
terest, whatever name may be given it, is termin-
ated by pa·yment of the debt secured * * •X< and no 
conve:vance by the mortgagee is ncessary to per-
fect the mortgagor's estate." (36 Am. Jur., Sec. 
413, 894 and cases cited.) 
The question whether appellant may defeat this inter-
est which is prior in time arises only if appellant is a 
purchaser in good faith for full consideration. 
Appellant purchased with notiee of ownership of 
the property in someone other than his grantor. He 
claims through Hansen who told him prior to complet-
ing the transaction that he (Hansen) did not own the 
_property. The record on page 135 reads: 
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· 'l \nut: You were asked to tell what you 
said to ~l r. Pender. 
"_.\: \Yell, in substance, I told him I didn't 
own the property.'' 
~ince appellant was notified directly that his grantor 
did not own the property which was to be conveyed, 
appellant wns put on notice that some other person 
owned the property. Appellant could not in good faith 
expect to obtain rights grea:ter than his grantor had to 
conYey, even over an unrecorded interest when knowledge 
had been brought home to appellant that his grantor had 
no interest. Appellant states (App. Brief 28) that there 
is no evidence that Hansen advised appellant during 
negotiations that the deed held by him was only a mort-
gage, and hence argues that appellant could not have 
had notice. This is not controlling for it is not essential 
to constitute lack of good faith that appellant receive a 
full explanation of his grantor's lack of Htle. 
A later purchaser who had information of a fact or 
facts that would put a prudent man on inquiry, and 
which would, if pursued, lead to actual knowledge of 
the state of the title, is not a purchaser in good faith. 
Possession of the land in one other than the grantor is 
sufficient fact to put on inquiry. (Toland v. Corey, 6 
Utah 392, 24 P. 190, aff'd 154 U. S. 499, 14 S. Ct. 1144.) 
The san1e result should follow if the purported grantor 
informs the later purchaser that he is not the owner. 
It is not essential that appellant be informed by 
Hansen of the exact state of the title. 
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''To char-ge a .person with notice of an out-
standing equitable interest it is not necessary that 
he have notice of the identity of the holder there-
of; it is sufficient if he has notice that the title 
of the person from whom he buys is subject to the 
outstanding interest." (55 Am. Jur., P. 1070.) 
Since Hansen told appellant that he did not own the 
property, appellant had notice that the title he pur-
chased was subject to an outstanding interest. 
Appellant lacked good faith for he deliberately ig-
nored interest outs~tanding against the title of his gran-
tor. (55 Am. Jur., See. 687, p. 1069). 
"The (recording) statute \Vas not enacted to 
protect one who:-·e ignorance of the title is deliber-
ate and intentional, nor does a 1nere nominal -con-
sideration satisfy the requirement that a valuable 
consideration must be paid. Its purpose is to pro-
tect. the man who honestly believes he is acquiring 
a good title, and who invests some substantial 
sum in reliance on that belief." Wisconsin River 
Land Co. v. Selover, 135 Wis. 594, 116 N. 265, 
16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1073 (1908). 
Substantially the same language is used in Beach v. 
Faust, 2 Cal. 2d 290, 40 P. 2d 822 (1935). 
Appellant cites authorities in his brief at pages 33 
to 35 to establish good faith in appellant but ~the cases 
are not analogous to the case at bar. The section quoted 
from Thompson on Real Pr-operty. Vo. 8, Sec. 4506, 
contains within itself the reason why appellant did not 
purchase in good faHh. 
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" * * * reasonable diligence * * * is held 
satisfied by the examination of the public records 
unl,ess h c has notice of d,efects not disclosed by 
the records." 
Respondents sub1nit that appellant had notice of defects 
not disclosed by the records-that his grantor did not 
haYe title - and therefore examination of records alone 
was not reasonable diligence. Respondents also submit 
that appellant was "wilfully blind'' (App. Brief 34) 
to the defects in his grantor's title. 
The annotation at 109 A.L.R. 746 et seq., cited by 
appellants (Page 34) is not in point with the case at bar 
for it is limited {o authorities dealing with notice to 
defeat good faith from sources such as ''reputation in 
the community", "common rumor", "hints", "general 
reports", and "casual conversation by strangers". Ap-
pellant did not learn of defects in his grantor's title by 
any of these sources. Appellant was told directly by his 
grantor. 
The case of Hall v. Livingston (App. Brief 35) is 
n.ot in point for the purchaser was told "by a certain 
person, prior to the purchase that such person under-
stood'' the ,property was subject to a trust. The informa-
tion did not come from an im1nediate source such as 
grantor; the court held the inforn1ation to be only a 
"common rumor". Respondents submit that the infor-
mation obtained by a:ppellant was a direct statement of 
defect in ,the title from appellant's grantor. The section 
quoted by appellant at page 35 from Hall v. Livingston 
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is incomplete and does not reveal the entire view of the 
court. The court continues : 
"It is not meant, by this (that notice m}lst 
be more than would excite a cautious and wary 
purchaser) that a purchaser can be affected only 
hy some direct an,d positive statement from the 
party interested; notice may be implied from cir-
eums tances (if clear and unequivocal).'' 
It is the court's position, therefore, that if a purchaser 
received a direct and positive statement, such would 
be a fortiori lack of good faith. 
The case of Raymond· v. Flavel is not in point be-
cause the court found no evidence showing that any de-
fect ever existed. 
Furthermore, appellant did not pay sufficient value 
to Hansen to obtain the protection of the recording 
statutes to defeat a prior unrecorded interest. 
The record discloses the amount paid by appellant 
to Hansen to be nominal. The record ( 143, 144) reads : 
"Q. (of l\fr. Hansen): Is your recolleetion of-the 
transaction that the amount was large con-
sidering the property or that it was a nomin-
al consideration~ 
A. I would say that it was almost nil relative 
to the value of the property.'' 
* * * * 
'' Q. Do you reeall whether it was less than a 
hundred dollars~ 
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A. I mn sure it was, sir. 
Q. Do you recall whether it was less than fifty 
dollars~ 
A. I an1 inclined to think it was." 
~\nd on page 1:11 : 
''Q. ~Ir. Pender, how much did you pay Mr. Han-
sen for that (the deed)~ 
. \. Twenty-five doilars." 
This amount of consideration is not adequate to 
enable appellant to be a bona fide purchaser for value. 
'' * * * protection (as a bona fide purchaser) 
has been denied where the amount paid was so 
insignificant in comparison with the value of the 
property as to be deemed unsubstantial * * * . '' 
(55 Am. Jur., Sec. 737, P. 1103). 
In the following cases the amount paid was so small~that 
the court denied protection as a bona fide purchaser: 
Wisconsin River Land Co. v. Selover, 135 Wis 594, 116 
N.\V. 265, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1073 (1908), (paid $5, as-
sessed for $150), (See annotation 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
1073); Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 31 N.E. 944 
(1892), (paid $10, worth $20,000); Bailey v. Colombe, 45 
S. D. 443, 188 N.W. 203 (paid no more than $100, worth 
$5,000); Dunn v. Barnun, 2 C.C.A. 265, 51 Fed. 355 (paid 
$100, worth $30,000) ; Ochenknowship v. Dunaj, 244 
N.Y.S. 267, aff'd 232 A. Div. 441, 251 N.Y.S. 589 (1930), 
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(required consideration to be "valuable" in the sense 
that a ''fair equivalent is given for the property grant-
ed''.) In the \Visconsin River Land Co. case, supra, 
which is closely in point ·with the case at bar, the court 
denied protection as a bona fide purchaser and stated: 
'' ,., o;(< * circumstances surrounding the pur-
ehase which conclusively show the wilful failure 
on the part of the defendant to make inquiry when 
inquiry was loudly suggested only reinforce the 
conclusion that the defendant purchased for a 
song only a mere possibility of title and that he 
was fully aware of that faet. '' 
It must appear that a purchaser under a quit claim 
deed is intending to purchase the land, and not merely 
a chance of title. (l\fcDonalcl v. Belding, 1-15 U. S. 492, 
36 L. Ed. 788, 12 S. Ct. 892; ~Toelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 
21, 37 L. Ed. 350, 13 S. Ct. 426.) 
Several courts have held that if a purchaser pay~ 
only a nominal consideration, such purchaser is by this 
fact alone put on notice that the title of his vendor is 
subject to unknown interests, and is therefore not an 
innocent purchaser. (Wisconsin River Land Co. v. Sel-
over, s1tpra; and Ten Eyck v. \Vitbeck, supra). While 
appellant in the case at bar had actual notice of an out-
standing interest, the nominal amount paid is an addi-
tional factor to negative good faith. The record reads 
on page 15_2, aHer ~fr. Pender had testified that he paid 
$2G for the property: 
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"Q. \Yhat would you say the present value of this 
piece of property is, Mr. Pender¥ 
~-\. In Ill)' estimation, property is worth just what 
you can get it for. 
Q. \Yonldn 't the market on this property 1n 
your opinion bring more than $5,0001 
A. I wouldn't know. * * * 
Q. \Yell, yon do know that property * * * south 
on :J[ain Street * * * has considerable value 
now, don't you? 
A. It has a certain value, reasonable value. I 
·would say it at least had the assessed value .. 
* * * " 
Appellant (App. Brief, 29) argues that respondents 
n1ay not assert that appellant has not paid valuable con-
sideration because the amount respondents have paid for 
the tax deed does not represent the full value of the 
property: On the question of bona fides of appellant, it 
is not material what amount respondents paid for the tax 
title. The issue does not turn on who paid the most 
consideration, but on priority of rights. The controlling 
point is whether appellant is entitled to the protection 
of the bona fide purchase doctrine to defeat a prior un-
recorded interest. If appellant has not paid adequate 
consideration, the unrecorded prior interest is not cut 
off and the title is in F. B. Bowers or the Bowers In-
vestment Company. And this will be decided without 
reference to evidence of amount paid for the tax deeds. 
Appellant apparently asserts the position that the 
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consideration is not nominal because they will be forced 
,to pay the tax .liens on the property before they can 
get clear title. (App. Brief~ 29-30). Whether appellant 
m~y now or in the future have to pay the tax liens or 
any other expenses incident to ownership is not material 
to the bona fides of appellant at the time he took a quit 
claim deed of the property from Hansen for $25. For 
appellant to avail himself of the bona fide purchase doc-
trine, he n1ust show that he paid sufficient value to Han-
sen, his grantor. 
Even if the value of the property is reduced by 'the 
amount of the tax liens which appellant asserts he 
n1ust pay in order to quiet title, the rema"ining value of 
the property is several thousand dollars. Then for this 
interest, appellant paid $25. This is still nominal con-
sideration. 
Point 6 
Refusal to p~ermit appellant to am,end his complaint in 
the midst of tbre trial was not error. 
This is argued by appellant as his Point 2. (App. 
Brief, 23-24). He says this motion was made "at the 
commencement of the trial of the case". Actually this 
1notion was made in the middle of the trial. (R. 146). 
Appellant's authorities indicate that permitting such 
amendment would probably not have been an abuse of 
discretion, and nothing more. Appellant made no offer 
of proof, indicated nothing about the nature of his claim 
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and has not shown any prejudice resulting from the 
denial of the motion. 
Appellant was not prejudiced by denial of his a·t-
tenlpt to plead laches since appellant failed to establish 
his own title. Estoppel of respondents from claiming 
title because of laches could not be asserted against re-
spondents to prevent respondents from showing that 
appellant had no title. Since the basis for the judg-
Inent of no cause of action of appellant against re-
spondents is appellant's lack of title, appellant could 
not have used evidence of estoppel even though it were 
pleaded. 
Apart from prejudice, the proposed amendment was 
untimely. 
The amendment, if permitted, would have intro-
duced a new issue requiring additional preparation and 
evidence. It was not offered prior to the trial but later 
in the proceedings-at 3 :32 P.M., of the day of trial (H. 
146). 
Point 7 
Respondents' ·evidenc·e of title was sufficient to sup-
port judgm·ent quieting their title against appellant. 
This is appellant's Point 4. 
How the court rules on respondent's claim cannot 
concern appellant if appellant has no ti>t.le. 
In Campbell v. Union Savings and Investment Co., 
63 Utah 37 4, 226 P. 190, 193, the plain tiff alleged he was 
the owner in fee simple and in possession of certain 
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land and the defendant claimed through a mortgage. 
The defendant's claim was judged invalid and judg-
ment \vas given for plaintiff. The defendant appealed 
and this Conrt affirmed, and stated: 
'' Tnw it is that defendant now insists that 
the plaintiff's proof of title is deficient. In view, 
however, of defendant's answer and counterclaim, 
that fact cannot affect her rights in the property. 
Let it be remembered that the court's judgment 
is expressly based upon the allegations of the 
complaint, the averments of the answer, and 
those in the reply. If, therefore, the defendant has 
shown no right to or interest in the premises, 
which it has not, how can it be heard to complain 
that the court erred in adjudging plaintiff to be 
the owner as against the defendant~ Certainly 
plaintiff's title, however defective it may be, is 
nevertheless ample to withstand ,the assaults of 
the defendant so long as the defendant shows no 
right, title or interest whatever in the property.'' 
In Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 609, 131 Pac. 37, at 
page 58 the court implies that an appellant who has no 
title cannot successfuJly dispute. a ruling permitting 
plaintiff to show additional title: 
"Appellant thus failed to prove title by ad-
verse possession and, since he also failed to prove 
any other title, the court was clearly justified in 
finding against his claim of title .... If it were 
conceded, therefore, that respondent had failed 
to prove a good ~title, or that the court had erred, 
as claimed by appellant, in permitting her to set 
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up an additional title ... Yet it n1ust also be con-
ceded that her title is ce~tainly good as against 
appellant, since he established no valid claim or 
title, either in law or equity, and for that reason 
also any error the court may have committed in 
the particular just stated could not have affected, 
and did not affect any of his rights.'' 
'• Having failed to establish title in himself, 
he cannot complain of insufficiency of the evi-
dence upon which the court adjudged title to be 
in the defendant.'' Hopkins v. Slusher, 266 Ky. 
300, 98 S.W. 2d 932, 108 A.L.R. 662. 
So long as the judgment against appellant Is af-
firmed the ruling on respondent's counterclaim and affir-
mative defense are comparatively unimportant. Re-
spondents' quarrel then becomes one with Bowers and 
Bowers Investment Company. Appellant carefully points 
out that Bowers filed a disclaimer. (App. Brief, 2). This 
was undoubtedly filed to avoid risk of costs under 104-
57-2, U.C.A. 1943. But appellant slyly agrues that this 
disclaimer was an admission that Bowers had never had 
a real claim and that he abandoned whatever claim he 
had. (App. Brief, 33). This disclailner was never served 
on respondents and counsel saw it for the first time af'ter 
the appeal was perfected. Had this been served on re-
spondents we would have moved to correct it to show 
that Bowers had sold his interest to respondents for 
many times what appellant paid Hansen for a quit claim 
deed. Surely appellant knows that the suggestion at 
page 33 of his Brief is both incorrect and improper. 
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And furthermore, since appellant asserts title in himself 
he cannot improve his position by virtue of the disclaimer 
of BowPrs. Pacific Bond and l\fortgage Co. v. Beaver 
County, 97 Utah 62, 89 Pac. 2d. 476 at 478. 
\Yhat interest are respondents shown hy the rec-
ord to have~ 
They have a deed from Salt Lake City which is not 
a redemption or payment of special assess1nents but a 
deed made following an offering and sale at public sale. 
(R. 177, 178; Exhibit A, pages 11 and 13). 
They haYP a prima facie title from certificate of 
sale and auditor's deed for general taxes. (R. 178-180; 
Exhibit A, pages 3, 5, 9). Appellant ~ays one of the 
auditor's affidavits was missing from the 1928 assess-
ment rolls. (App. Brief, 6). This is not in evidence. 
(Sec. R. 117, 178-180). 
The~· have paid taxes for 1946, 1947 and 1948. (R. 
177). 
They are in possession. (R. 91 Finding No. 10). 
The regularit)· of the city's special assessment pro-
cedure was discussed (R. 118-119, 123-125, 180), but was 
not inquired into as the Court and counsel believed a 
remand and new trial would be necessar~· in any event 
if appellant obtained a reversal. (R. 182-183). 
The appellant having failed to show title, respond-
ents can .prevail on the fact of possession found by the 
court, and admitted by appellant's failure to deny the 
allegations of paragraph 6 of the counterclaim. (R. 20, 
54). 
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The r tah statute 10-1-;)7 -1, U.C.A. 1943 has not been 
construed on this particular question__Jthe sufficiency of 
possession to quiet title. But courts in other jurisdictions 
construing identical and similar stautes have held that 
possesson is sufficient. In Crandall v. Goss, 1917, 30 Ida. 
661, 167 Pac. 1025 at 1027, possession not sufficient to 
give plaintiff adverse possessory title was held suffi-
cient to support a judgment quieting title. The Idaho 
statute construed was identical with the present Utah 
10-l:-57 -1. 
''this action may be n1aintained by res,pond-
ent for possession of land in controversy and for 
purpose of quieting his title thereto as against 
appellant. ' ' 
To the same effect Is Child v. l\f organ, 51 1\iinn. 116, 
52 N.\Y. 1127; and Knight v. Anderson, 38 Minn. 384, 
37 N.W. 796 (possession of land sufficient to quiet title 
even without proof by plaintiff of his interest in the 
land). 
In Bremer v. Bigelow, 8 Kan. 496, actual possession 
was held to be sufficient to give occupant right to quiet 
title against any person claiming an adverse interest. 
The Kansas statute is practic3;lly the same as the pres-
ent 104-57-1. 'To the same eff-ect are Wilson v. Glenn, 
123 Kan. 16, 254 Pac. 694; Cramer v. l\IcCann, 83 Kan. 
219, 112 Pac. 832; Giltenan v. Lemert, 13 Kan. 476; 
Giles v. Ortman, 11 Kan. 59. 
In Cramer v. -l\fcCann, supra, the court stated: 
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"The appellants (defendants who had no 
title) can only prevail upon their cross petition 
upon the strength of their own title, and not upon 
the weakness of their adversary's. 
Never having acquired any title fo the real 
estate themselves, they were not entitled to af-
firmative relief, and appellee (seeking to quiet 
title) having been in peaceable possession of the 
property under a claim of title when the action 
was brought, the judgment, (quieting title in ap-
pellee) so far as any rights of appellants are con-
cerned, is affirmed.'' 
See also annotation 46 L.R.A. N.S. 502 which col-
lects authorities in accord. Cases cited to be contra 
construe statutes 'lvhich differ materially from U.C.A. 
104-57-1. 
44 Am. Jur. states the rule: (at 37) 
''Proof of the simple fact of possession of 
property has been held as a general rule to en-
title the possessor to maintain a suit to quiet 
title against ... a claimant without title .... '' 
(Cases cited). 
51 C. J. states the rule: (at 172) 
"But under many statutes providing for 
actions for the determination of adverse claims, 
it has been held that one in possession of, and 
claiming title to, land may maintain the action 
without further evidence of title.'' (Citing cases). 
Utah authorities by dictum and implieation sustain 
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the position that possession 1s sufficient interest to 
quiet title. In Babrock v. Dangerfield, 1939, 98 Utah 10, 
~)-1: P. 2d 863, the court held that prin1a facie title was 
sufficient to enable a plaintiff to quiet title, even though 
a plaintiff Inust succeed on the strength of his own title. 
The court did not hold that prima facie title was the 
only interest "'hich was sufficient to quiet title. The 
rourt at 864 quoted language with approval from Red-
mond \~. :JicLean, 32 Cal. App. 729, 164 P. 15: 
"At the trial plaintiff, in support of his 
rlaim, testified that at the commencement of the 
action he was, and for a long time prior thereto 
had been, in possession of said lot .... This evi-
dence, uncontradicted, was sufficient as a prima 
facie showing to es'tablish plaintiff's right as 
against defendant to a decree quieting his title 
to the lot ~o described.'' 
A claim of possession was therefore ruled to be 
sufficient. 
In Mercur Coalition Min. Co. v. Cannon, 1947, --------
Utah ________ , 184 P. 2d. 341 at 342, the court found that the 
plaintiff did not have possession but by dictum indicated -
that possession would be sufficient: 
"Appellant relies on the rule of law that 
actual possession under a claim of ownership 
makes out a prima facie case against a stranger 
to the title, and unless controverted by one claim-
ing an interest in the property is sufficient to 
justify a decree quieting title jn the plaintiff. If 
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the evidence was sufficient for the court to make 
a finding thrut appellant was in actual possession 
under a claim of ownership, then it would be 
necessary for the defendant to establish an in-
tf're~;t in himself." 
Appellant argues that the title conveyed to respond-
ents by Salt Lake City could not be valid because based 
on an assessment prior to the sale for general taxes 
(App. Brief, 39-40). Appellant cites Petterson v. Ogden 
City, ........ Ftah ........ , 176 P. 2d. 599, and Western Bever-
age Co. v. Hansen, 98 Utah 332, 96 P. 2d. 1105, as so 
holding. 
Let it be assumed here that the tax title from the 
county was invalid for failure of the auditor to include 
no affidavit on the 1928 assessment rolls. This means 
that no valid general tax assessment was made and 
there is therefore nothing to interfere with the inquiry 
of whether the city's title based upon special assessn1ents 
was valid. The Western Beverage case holds simply that 
a valid general tax lien takes precedence over an other-
wise valid city tax lien. The Petterson case holds the 
general tax deed in that case to be void and then con-
siders the validity of the city's special assessment lien. 
It is patent that if Ogden City followed assessment pro-
ced~ues correctly it would ultimately prevail in that con-
troversy. That rule should be applied to this case, if 
this question should he considered. 
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SU~LMARY AND CONCLUSION 
.:\ppellant has not shown himself entitled to any re-
lief in this Court from the judgm·ent of the trial court 
that his quit claim deed was ineffectual to pass title, 
both because the consideration paid was nominal and be-
cause appellant had notice that his grantor had no title. 
This being true, appellant is in no position ·to question 
this Court in affirming the judgment of the Distrct 
Court. 
Beyond this, respondents have shown that they were 
in possession of the property and are therefore entitled 
to the decree quieting their title against appellant, with-
out consideration of whether the tax title or the deed 
from Salt Lake City or the payment of taxes for three 
years gave to respondents a sufficient title to support 
a judgment quieting title. The Court should therefore 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
The first question raised chronologically was the mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings, raising the special 
statutes of limitations applicable to land where county 
tax deeds have been given. Appellant's snit was brought 
after the 4-year period had run and appellant did not 
bring himself within Section 104-2-41, U.C.A., 1943, 
because additional and necessary parties were added to 
the first suit which was commenced within time. These 
statutes protect the holder of the tax titles, and parti-
cularly where such holder is in possession, and the re-
spon<lents should have prevailed on that motion and 
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should prevail in this Court should it be considered. And 
if the Court should conclude that appellant came within 
the protection of 104-2-41, then he should be barred by 
Section 104-29-2 because the first suit failed on its merits 
and the bringing of the same suit a second time was 
barred by this statute. The trial judge did not rule on 
this question but indicated that if it became material his 
ruling would be against the appellant. 
This lea Yes undisposed of in the trial court the valid-
ity of the title respondents obtained from Salt Lake 
City and the claim of Bowers Investment Company, 
which could have been interpleaded on the court's own 
motion. It appears unnecessary that either of these mat-
ters be inquired into and unnecessary that a new trial be 
ordered for the purpos·e of examining into any further 
matters. 
The judgment of the District Court should be af-
finned and respondents should have their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
Attorneys for R. L. Bird and 
Mae C. Bird, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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